In general, a
transcendental argument takes some generalised features of experience (the
premises) and infers conditions for these features to be the case (the
conclusion). The status or credibility of a transcendental argument depends,
therefore, in part upon the premises from which the argument proceeds. To what
extent are the premises employed really generalised and uncontested
observations? Moreover, the status of a transcendental argument will rest on
the deductions made from the premises to their underlying conditions. If it is
claimed that these conditions are necessary for the features of experience to
be possible, deductions made can leave no room for doubt. The full
epistemological burden of the argument will rest upon the initial premises and
the subsequent deductive inferences made. If the claim made, however, is
relaxed from necessary conditions to plausible explanations that will render
the premises intelligible, the epistemological burden of the argument will be somewhat
different. In such cases, the transcendental deductions will only aim at
rendering acceptable and likely explanations of the initial observations. There
may, in other words, be other possible explanations. Additional support for the
conclusion offered may then be sought in sources outside the transcendental
argument itself, such as specific empirical examples, illustrations and so on
that bear on the questions at hand. Invoking additional backing of this kind,
however, makes us leave the realm of ‘pure’ philosophising and enter the realm
of combined philosophical and scientific enterprise.
While
transcendental arguments, under ideal conditions, might be relied upon to
produce conclusions of high credibility, the prospects for such attainment when
applied to social material are rather unpromising. Within the social sphere it
is hard to find uncontested generalised observations of relevant features. And
even if sufficiently interesting and uncontested generalised features were to
be obtained, deductions made from them are quite unlikely to support claims to
necessary underlying conditions for the premises to be the case. Due to the
complexity of social reality one will, more often than not, have to settle for
the more modest claim of plausible explanations in deductions or inferences of
this kind. In general then, transcendental arguments within the social realm
can hardly be relied upon to provide decisive arguments for the existence of any
phenomena of interest, and hence for supplying a ‘pure’ philosophical or
rationalistic support of any social ontology.
*Lawson (2009), Tony, Ontology & Economics,
Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London, p.p. 47-48.